A Cryptanalysis of the High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection System

Abstract

We describe a practical attack on the High Bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) scheme. HDCP is a proposed identity-based cryptosystem for use over the Digital Visual Interface bus, a consumer video bus used in digital VCRs, camcorders, and personal computers. Public/private key pairs are assigned to devices by a trusted authority, which possesses a master secret. If an attacker can recover 40 public/private key pairs that span the module of public keys, then the authority's master secret can be recovered in a few seconds. With the master secret, an attacker can eavesdrop on communications between any two devices and can spoof any device, both in real time. Additionally, the attacker can produce new key pairs not on any key revocation list. Thus the attacker can completely usurp the trusted authority's power. Furthermore, the protocol is still insecure even if all devices' keys are signed by the central authority.