Coalition Formation in a Power Transmission Planning Environment

Matthias Klusch, J. Contreras, F. Wu, and Onn Shehory
Proc. 2. International Conference on Practical Applications of Multi-Agent Systems, May, 1997.


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Abstract
The study of a decentralized coalition formation scheme in an speci c Power Systems transmission expansion scenario is the purpose of this paper. We defi ne first who are the players in the expansion game, and provide a decentralized coalition scheme based on Bilateral Shapley Values. We study the stability properties of our approach to allocate expansion costs to all coalition members. Finally, the resulting coalition scheme from Bilateral Shapley Value negotiation is compared with a centralized approach.

Notes

Text Reference
Matthias Klusch, J. Contreras, F. Wu, and Onn Shehory, "Coalition Formation in a Power Transmission Planning Environment," Proc. 2. International Conference on Practical Applications of Multi-Agent Systems, May, 1997.

BibTeX Reference
@inproceedings{Klusch_1997_1149,
   author = "Matthias Klusch and J. Contreras and F. Wu and Onn Shehory",
   title = "Coalition Formation in a Power Transmission Planning Environment",
   booktitle = "Proc. 2. International Conference on Practical Applications of Multi-Agent Systems",
   month = "May",
   year = "1997",
}